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Arnold: Constitutional Law--Imprisonment of the Indigent for Non-Payment

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPRISONMENT OF
THE INDIGENT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF FINES
Few would care to say there can be equal
justice where the kind of punishment a man
gets depends on the amount of money he
has.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of equal protection became a viable constitutional remedy for the economically deprived after the 1956
United States Supreme Court decision of Griffin Vl.Illinois.'
This case was an effort to alleviate discrimination in the
judicial process against those unable to pay the cost of litigation by removing indigency as a factor in the administration
of justice. Despite some criticism of this egalitarianism, later
caseS2 have reinforced this attempt to mitigate the disparate
treatment of indigents in the criminal process. Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court has been particularly tardy in applying
equal protection to indigents who are imprisoned for the non-

payment of fines. Although the Supreme Court's recognition
of equal protection for indigents is a relatively recent development, the lateness of its application to imprisonment for nonpayment of fines seems strange when one considers the wide
acceptance and broad use of this form of punishment. This

type of punishment originated in twelfth-century England 3
* Edgerton, C.
(D.C. Cir. 1960).

J. dissenting in Wildeblood v. U. S., 284 F2d 592, 593

1. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). This case held that the failure to provide an indigent with a trial transcript which was necessary for appeal is unconstitutional.
2. E.g. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1962), which held that when the
merits of the only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit
of counsel in a State criminal case, there has been a discrimination between the
rich and the poor which violates equal protection guarantees of the Constitution; sce also Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). A state statute requiring
an unsuccessful indigent appellant to repay the cost of a transcript used in preparing his appeal which applies only to one incarcerated, but not to others
constitutes invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
3. SUTHERLAND and CRESsy, CRimINOLoGY 275 (6th ed. 1960).
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and its wide acceptance in this country has been accentuated
by the ever increasing use of fines 4 in this century.
This Case Comment is an attempt to show how the law
has progressed under the standard of equal protection when
faced with opposition from one of the longest standing widely
used practices in this country's legal system.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE INDIGENT

Anytime a court is faced with an equal protection problem, there is a basic analytical procedure it must apply in
order to properly decide the merits of the case. The equal protection remedy, unlike other constitutional rights is limited
by the use of comparison to other "similarly situated" individuals. In other words, if the government were violating
everyone's constitutional rights then equal protection would
not be a viable remedy. In deciding a case under equal protection analysis, the court must consider the rationality of
the unequal treatment received by the individual or group alleging discrimination. The nature of the classification has a
direct bearing on the standard of rationality that is required
to justify the difference in treatment.
There are certain "suspect classifications" that give rise
to a presumption of "invidious discrimination." Griffin -V.
Illinois5 placed classifications based on poverty into this suspect group along with other classifications based on "religion,
race or color." The Court, in considering the rationality of this
classification, concluded,
"Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence." 6

It is interesting to note that in situations involving "suspect
classifications" the presumption against rationality can only
be overcome by a compelling state interest. Even if there is
a compelling state interest to be served by the classification
under attack, the State must show that there is not an alternative that would serve the same purpose. The real impact
of classification as a "suspect classification" is that it shifts
4. This has been attributed to the increased number of "minor offenses"
with some estimates figuring that fines constitute 75% of all sentences imposed
in the United States. RuDIN, CRIMNAL ConmcnoN 230 (1963).
5. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

The court in articulating this concept, said "In

criminal trials a state can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on
account of religion, race or color." Id. at 18.

6. Id. at 18.
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the burden of proof from those alleging discrimination to the
State.
In Griffin the State was unable to show a compelling

State interest that could give rationality to this classification.7
With this shifting of the burden of proof to the State, Griffin

has served as a spring board from which indigents have been
able to attack other discriminatory practices. Although later
decisions 8 extended this concept beyond the Griffin factual
situation, it was Douglas v. California9 that brought this analysis to its now imposing stature. The Court noted that the
evil being attacked in Douglas was the same as in Griffin,

discrimination against the indigent. Since this case involved
a "suspect classification," the State was required to justify a
system that denied the right to counsel on appeal to most
indigents. This denial was based on a summary determination
by a state court that the appeal was without merit. 10 The
Court concluded that there was no compelling state interest
being served by this discrimination; therefore, it was an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the laws. Armed
with the analysis in these decisions indigents have slowly been
reaching true equal status in the situations where there is no
rational reason for unequal treatment.
7. The State argued that it was under no duty to provide appellate review
and that if it did provide appellate review, it had a right to make decisions based
on the expense of providing this service. Mr. Justice Frankfurter answered this
very cogently in his concurring opinion:
"Neither the fact that a State may deny the right of appeal altogether nor the right of a State to make an appropriate classification
based on differences in crimes and their punishment nor the right
of a State to lay down conditions it deems appropriate for criminal
appeals, sanctions differentiations by a State that have no relation
to a rational policy of criminal appeal or authorizes the imposition
of conditions that offered the deepest presupporitions of our
society."
Id. at 22.
8. See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) ; Smith v. Bernett, 365
U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
9. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
10. The Court, in defining the nature of the discrimination involved, said,
"[T]he rich man, who appeals, as of right, enjoys the benefit of
counsel's examination into the record, research of the law and
marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already
burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is without
merit is forced to shift for himself."
Id. at 398.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

3

19721

South Carolina
Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 10
COMMENTS

Obviously imprisonment for non-payment of a fine has
an inherent detrimental effect on indigents; however, the
problem has been to decide whether this detrimental effect
is justified by a compelling state interest. Before examining
how the United States Supreme Court applied the GriffinDouglas rule in this situation, we should consider earlier cases
challenging imprisonment of indigents for the non-payment
of fines.

III. THE "PRE-WiLLiAMS" APPROACH
Although it now seems apparent that the state interests
in imprisonment of indigents for non-payment of fines are
more illusory than real, the courts of this country took a long
time before recognizing the basic lack of merit in this method
of punishment." There are actually four possible situations
where imprisonment for non-payment discriminates against
the indigent. These may be categorized as first, where the
fine is the only statutorily approved punishment;12 second,
the "thirty day or thirty dollar" alternative sentence situation ;13 third, where imprisonment for non-payment, combined
with the original jail sentence, results in a term of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum sentence ;14 and fourth,
where imprisonment for non-payment combined with the
original jail sentence, results in a term of imprisonment less
than the maximum statutory limitation.' 5 While there is some
confusion as to which situations are unconstitutionally discriminatory there is no doubt about the unconstitutionality of
the first and third situations. Unfortunately, the discriminatory nature of any of these situations has not always been
recognized by our courts.
11. Caveat, many courts still see merit in this form of punishment under
limited situations. E.g. Kelly v. Schoonfield, 285 F. Supp. 732 (D. Md. 1968);
United States ex rel. Privetera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd

345 F.2d 533 (2d cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1956).
12. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) ; Kelly v. Schoonfield, 285 F. Supp.
732, 735 (D. Md. 1968).
13. See Comment, Fines, Inprisonment and the Poor: "Thirty Dollars or
Thirty Days," 57 CALIF. L. REv. 778 (1969). This plan offers no real choice
to a man too poor to pay the fine.
14. This is the principal situation which has been held unconstitutional.
E.g. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) ; People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y. 2d
101, 218 N.E. 2d 686, 271 N.Y.S. 2d 972 (1966).

15. E.g. United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118
(S.D.N.Y.), a! 'd, 345 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965).
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In U.S. ex rel. Priviterav. Kross,1 6 a federal district court
rejected what seemed a logical extension of the GriffinDouglas approach. This court took cognizance of the decisions
making review of criminal convictions available to indigents,
but reasoned that these cases should not be construed to compel the eradication of every disadvantage caused by indigency.
The determinative point in this decision was that the aggregate sentence did not exceed the maximum allowable jail sentence. The court in Kross considered the equal protection
problems presented by imprisonment for the non-payment of
fines.
Indigents have made several unsuccessful attacks on this
form of discrimination under other theories of law. In State
v. Hampton,1' the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to recognize an indigent's claim that continued confinement to
"work off" a fine after his initial jail term constituted "cruel
and unusual punishment," without making any apparent distinction between an indigent offender and one who is able
to pay his fine. Before equal protection became in vogue as
a constitutional remedy, the eighth amendment's protection
against "cruel and unusual punishment" loomed as the most
promising form of relief available to indigents. The United
States Supreme Court's definition of this amendment guaranteed its reflection of current civilized standards:
The amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
18
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.

The promise of this concept was reflected in some very early
cases, which determined that when a sentence included a term
of imprisonment in addition to a fine, imprisonment for nonpayment of the fine was an invalid abuse of the court's power:
When the legislature enacted these provisions of the statute providing
for the punishment of an offense by fine or imprisonment or both, it
was not contemplated that, when a punishment by imprisonment was
imposed, thereafter another should be added because the fine was not
paid. The degradation and punishment by imprisonment are greater
than that by fine. Such a judgment would be excessive, in that it-would
16. Id. Where an indigent was sentenced to 30 days and a fine of $500 or 60
additional days for non-payment, this court held there was no denial of equal
protection because the aggregate sentence of 90 days did not exceed the statutory maximum of 1 year.
17. 209 So. 2d 899 (Miss. 1968).
18. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1962).
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impose imprisonment for the non-payment of a debt or fine due the

state after the right to punish by imprisonment had been exhausted.'

9

Despite this early promise and the Supreme Court's assurances of the contemporariness of the standard, most courts
have rejected assertions that imprisonment for non-payment

of a fine constitutes cruel and unusual punishment even if the
statutory maximum for the substantive offense has been exceeded. 2 One case, People v. McMillan,21 did, however, hold
that if a fine was found to be the appropriate punishment,
then five months imprisonment for non-payment was excessive. With the maturation of equal protection as a viable
remedy for indigents, the concept of "cruel and unusual pun-

ishment" will receive very little judicial attention in this context in the future.
IV.

MODERN APPROACH

Although there were a few earlier decisions holding default imprisonment to be a denial of equal protection, 22 this

concept matured through puberty when the United States
Supreme Court handed down Williams v. Illinois23 and fol24
lowed it up with a logical extension in Tate v. Short.

19. Roberts v. Howells, 22 Utah 289, 62 P. 892, 893 (1900); accord,
People v. Brown, 113 Cal. 35, 45 P. 181 (1896) ; People v. Kerr, 75 Cal. App.
273, 144 P. 584 (1911) ; People v. Verlarde, 45 Cal. App. 520, 188 P. 59 (1920).
1 - 20. People ex rel. Crockett v. Redman, 41 Misc. 2d 962, 246 N.Y.S. 2d 861
(Supp. Ct. 1964); Henderson v. U.S., 189 A.2d 132 (D.C. App. 1963); Adjni
v. State, 139 So. "2d 179 (D.C. App. Fla. 1962) ; Lee v. State, 103 Ga. App. 161,
118 S.E.2d 599 (1961) ; People v. Magoni, 73 Cal. App. 78, 238 P. 112 (1925);
Foertsch v. Jameson, 48 S.D. 328, 204 N.W. 175 (1925).
21. 53 Misc. 685, 279 N.Y.S. 2d 941 (Sup. Ct. 1967), this decision did not
reject imprisonment for non-payment since the ration decidendi was the archaic
conversion ratio at which the indigent would be required to "work off" his fine,
one dollar per day.
22. Sawyer v. District of Columbia, 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. App. 1968). "We
hold this sentence invalid and'are of the opinion that in every case in which
the defendant is indigent, a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment
of a fine which-exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment which could be
imposed under the substantive statute as an original sentence is an invalid
exercise of the court's discretion .

.

." Id. at 318. People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.

2d 101, 218 N.E. 2d 686, 271 N.Y.S. 2d 972 (1966) (the court invalidated the
default imprisonment holding it a denial of equal protection).
23. 399 U.S. 235 (1970). For those who have long criticized the egalitarianism of the "Warren Court" in earlier indigency cases, it should be noted
that this decision was rendered unanimously by the "Burger Court" with the
Chief Justice writing the opinion.
24. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
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Williams represented the much belated extension of the
Griffin-Douglas rule into this area. This case involved reversal of historic practices of long standing among the several
states and the Federal Government since the use of imprisonment to "work off" fines for those unable or unwilling to pay
has been universally used in the past as an effective and convenient means of collection. The Court took judicial notice of
the breadth of this practice in its opinion,2 5 while also noting
that even the U.S Supreme Court had given its tacit approval
in the past. 26 Past history was not considered sufficient to
justify this practice when compared to the constitutional deprivations involved. This case, like Tate, involved imprisonment for failure to pay a fine, but, unlike Tate, it involved
an extension of a prison sentence beyond its maximum statutory limits for that purpose. In Williams, the court, although
stressing the wide latitude allowed states in fixing sentences,
stated that
[Olnce the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it may not then
subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely by reason of their in27
digency.

The Court was quick to stress that this statute which required
"work off" incarceration was not unconstitutional per se, but
it was in application because, in fact, it presents an illusory
choice for indigents who do not have the resources to choose
to pay the fine. The analysis involved in this case was familiar. The indigents represented a suspect classification;
therefore, the burden of justifying the discrimination shifted
to the State. The alleged compelling state interest was that
the use of imprisonment for the non-payment of fines furthered the State's penological aims. This interest does not
require imprisonment because the court has already determined that a fine will satisfy the state's interest. The later
imposition of imprisonment vitiates that determination. An25. 399 U.S. at 256. South Carolina's default payment statute was included
in this survey, S.C. CODE ANN. §17-574 (1962) which provides that offenders
may be committed to jail if they are unable to pay forfeitures, until amount
is satisfied. There is no analytical reason to assume that this statute is constitutional in light of Tate.
26. See Hill v. U.S. ex rel. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460 (1938) (mem.); Ex
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
27. 399 U.S. at 241.
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other interest alleged by the State was that to do otherwise

would place an undue financial burden on the state.28 This
position was held untenable as applied to this situation,2 9 in
fact there are indications that the State actually suffers a

financial loss in opting for this form of enforcement. 30
Tate v. Short,3 1 decided mainly on the authority of Wil-

Zms, derives its judicial significance as an extension of the
novel decision in Williams. Tate involved an indigent traffic

offender who was imprisoned in lieu of fine payment rather
than the extension of a maximum sentence of imprisonment
because of a fine. In fact, the Corporation Court of Houston,

the sentencing court in this case, did not have the power to

sentence one to jail,32 except for failure to pay a fine.8 3 This

defendant was subjected to imprisonment solely because of
his impecunious condition. Although an extension of Williams,

the problem presented in this case was anticipated earlier by
28. See SILVIG, Inconsistencies in Present Criminal Procedure, in ESSAYS
ON CRIfINAL PROCEDURES 354-56 (1964).
29. It is interesting to note that in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970),
the Supreme Court held that fiscal considerations would not justify the abridgment of important individual freedoms.
30. The national average for the per capita cost for prisoners is approximately $2,000. The President's Comn'n on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: THE COURTS 15 (1967).
31. 401 U.S. 395 (1971) ; the petitioner in this case had accumulated fines
of $425 on nine convictions for traffic offenses. He was unable to pay this
amount because of his "impoverished condition," a fact which was stipulated
by the prosecution. This inability to pay caused him to be imprisoned under a
Texas Statute which required indigent traffic offenders to "work off" their
fines while committed to a municipal prison farm.
32. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.14 (1966) provides:
"The corporation court in each incorporated city, town, or village
of this State shall have jurisdiction within the corporate limits in
all criminal cases arising under the ordinances of such city, town
or village, and shall have concurrent jurisdiction with any justice
of the peace in any precinct in which said city, town or village
is situated in all criminal cases arising under the criminal laws of
this State, in which punishment by fine only, and where the maximum of such fine may not exceed two hundred dollars, and arising
with such corporate limits."
33. HOUSTOn, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES §35-8 (1968) provides: "Each
prisoner committed to the city jail or to the municipal prison farm for nonpayment of the fine arising out of his conviction of a misdemeanor in the corporation court shall receive credit against such fine of five dollars ($5.00)
for each day or fraction of a day that he has served."
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the Supreme Court in Morris v. Schoonfield.34 In Morris, the
Court articulated a prohibition against automatic conversion
to a jail sentence when an indigent cannot pay his fine immediately. The Court in Tate, was bothered mainly by the fact
that the imprisonment of the defendant was not in keeping
with the penological aims of the State as defined by the statute which made a fine the sole penalty for these particular
traffic violations. Once these penological aims have been defined, the State should be loathe to so readily impose an
inconsistent form of punishment on an offender merely because of his indigency. The Court was careful to note that this
decision was not intended to make the states powerless in
enforcing fines against indigents, but was intended to encourage them to work out methods of payment of fines which fall
in between imprisonment and the inverse discrimination of
not enforcing payment. One plan suggested by the Court is the
installment plan which is used in several states3 5 with apparent success, but, as the court stressed, the states are free
to work out their own alternative plans which would be consistent with the Court's opinion.
Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the result in Tate based
on his concurring opinion in Williams. He would have reached
the same result but for different reasons. He was concerned
with analysis of the issue from a "due process" point of reasoning rather than the more vulnerable "equal protection"
argument. In answering the arguments usually put forth for
the state not using the installment plan for repayment of
fines, namely the convenience of imprisonment as a form of
collection and the deterrent value of immediate payment of
fines, Mr. Justice Harlan dismissed the latter as untrue and
concerning the former, said,
34. 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970). "[T]he same constitutional defeat condemned in Williams also adheres in jailing an indigent for failing to make
immediate payment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a
jail term and whether or not the jail term of an indigent extends beyond the
maximum term that may be imposed on a person willing and able to pay the
fine. In each case, the Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine
as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full."
35. E.g. CAL. PENAL CODE §1205 (West 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11,
§4332 (c) (Supp. 1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 38, §4(a) (2) (Supp. 1970);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 279, §/A (1959); N.Y. CODE Clam. PRoc. §470d
(1) (b) McKinny (Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. §9.92.070 (1961).
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Given the interest of the individual affected, I do not think a State
may, after declaring itself indifferent between a fine and jail, rely
on the convenience of the latter as a constitutionally acceptable means
for enforcing its interest given the existence of less restrictive alter86
natives.

Mr. Justice Harlan would not have limited Williams to its
factual situation but would have made it applicable in cases
where the extended sentence for non-payment of a fine did
not exceed the maximum imprisonment. This would make
any imprisonment, beyond the court designated sentence, for
non-payment of a fine unconstitutional.
Although this decision represents a logical extension of
the Williams case, it does not represent its logical conclusion.
The Court left open the answer to the problem of the use of
imprisonment for enforcement where despite the employment
of an alternative means, the defendant's reasonable effort
to pay the fine is unsuccessful. The decision, as was carefully
stressed by the Court, was not intended to make indigents a
privileged group, immune from enforcement if an indigent
chose not to pay. Imprisonment will continue to be a viable
alternative for the enforcement of fines, but the states will
not be allowed to use it for a mere tool of convenience. Based
on the reasoning and the tone of this decision, one should not
be surprised to see imprisonment as an alternative to the payment of a fine upheld in future cases where a concrete situation involving either the refusal of an indigent to pay a fine
under any plan or where a hopeless indigent is unable to pay
back on any basis. In the former situation the state would
probably not be required to search too far for an alternative
method of enforcement, but in the latter situation the state,
in order to justify the use of imprisonment, should and probably would be required to exhaust every alternative means
possible, short of non-payment.
"Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days"
The Supreme Court in Williams and Tate expressed no
opinion on the "thirty dollars or thirty days" type punishment. Analytically there is no reason to differentiate this
situation from the "automatic conversion from a fine to a jail
sentence" approach that was held unconstitutional in Tate.
36. 399 U.S. at 264.
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The choice between paying the fine or choosing to go to jail
is just as illusory for an indigent as is the choice in Tate. The
Fifth Circuit 37 has held the "thirty dollar or thirty days" type
sentence to be a violation of equal protection. This case contained the typical equal protection analysis with the creation
of a suspect classification shifting the burden of proof to the
State to justify the unequal treatment by showing a compel]ing state interest. The State alleged that the public's interest
in the collection of revenues, the rehabilitation of offenders,
and the deterrent effect on offenders were important enough
to justify this unequal treatment. All of these interests seem
to have been just as applicable in Williams and Tate. The
Fifth Circuit agreed that the State had a real interest in all
three, but noted that this method of punishment was not the
only way to satisfy those interests. Since this method is dis..
criminatory, the burden is on the State to find other methods
of satisfying these interests.
Conclusion
Tate represents no more than one more step in the direc..
tion of the removal of pecuniary elements from our judicial
process, hopefully taking the one step closer to the removal
of indigency as a factor in the administration of justice. Under the concepts articulated in Tate, the United States Supreme Court has placed the burden of finding constitutionally
acceptable methods of enforcing fines on indigents other than
an automatic resort to imprisonment. There are several possible solutions with the most obvious being the abolition of all
fines and punishing by imprisonment only. Although this
might seem like an easy theoretical solution since there has
been doubt expressed as to the efficacy of fines as a form of
punishment, 38 realistically there are many crimes in our society which simply do not warrant imprisonment of the violators. Also, the fines collected have evolved into an important
method of governmental taxation A9 Another possible solution
would be to make the amount of a fine depend on an individual's pecuniary status since a fifty dollar fine would mean
nothing to a man of means where it would be an insufferable
37. Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1972).
38. See genterally Barrett, The Role of Fites in the Administration of
Criminal Justice in Massachusetts,48 MAss. L. Q. 435 (1963).
39. RurliN, supra note 4, at 230.
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burden on certain particular destitute indigents. This type
of punishment seems appropriate to all except the extremely
poor person who could not pay any fine at all. It would not
be in anyone's best interest to allow him to escape any type
of punishment. Another alternative, possibly the most viable,
is the installment payment plan which was suggested by the
Supreme Court in Tate.40 This plan would allow the state to
save the expense of maintaining the indigents in prison and
it would give the indigent a real choice of whether to pay back
the fine under some reasonable plan or go to jail. This is the
alternative that our system now offers non-indigents. As the
Supreme Court has stressed, states are free to devise their
own alternatives ;41 however, whatever the plan devised, it
must provide for non-discriminatory treatment for indigents
or it cannot stand.
RICHARD A. ARNOLD

40. 401 U.S. at 400.

41. Id.
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